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THE LEWIS F. POWELL JR.
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE

Revisiting the 1938 Rules Experiment
The Honorable Paul V. Niemeyer
It is a genuine pleasure to be here at this graceful Law
School. I can say that there is some intangible aspect that makes
this place special, and I have always enjoyed coming here.
I wish to thank the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Lecture Series Board,
in particular Po Lutken, John Cleveland, and Zach Agee for their
kind invitation and Po, John, as well as Ryan Starks and Devin
Catlin, for their generous hospitality.
*

*

*

It is a particular honor to be delivering a lecture named in
honor of Justice Lewis Powell. The Justice was a most
distinguished alumnus of this University and its Law School, and
it is fitting that the Law School provides the home for his papers.
I was particularly pleased to have met with John Jacob, the
especially knowledgeable Archivist of Justice Powell’s papers.
After Justice Powell retired from the Supreme Court, he
chose to sit periodically with the Fourth Circuit for a number of
years and would have dinner with the judges during the week of
our court sittings. I recall him describing in remarkable detail his
initial hesitancy in accepting appointment to the Supreme Court
and how Mrs. Powell (whom he fondly referred to as Jo for
Josephine) advised him that he could not turn the President
down. I also remember a discussion during one of these dinners
in which one of the judges asked Justice Powell what opinion of
the Court he most regretted. Without hesitancy, he responded:
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,1 which I took to be an expression of
his love for the legal profession and his regard for it as a noble
profession. You may recall that in Bates, the Court held, among
 The Lewis F. Powell Jr. Distinguished Lecture presented March 27,
2014, at the Washington and Lee School of Law. The Honorable Paul V.
Niemeyer, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
1. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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other things, that the law profession’s blanket regulation of
advertising by attorneys could not be justified under the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.2 Justice Powell dissented from
this holding, noting, “It is clear that within undefined limits
today’s decision will effect profound changes in the practice of
law, viewed for centuries as a learned profession.”3
Justice Powell was himself the epitome of graciousness. For
example, whenever he sat with us, we always offered to let him
preside, but he never chose to do so. He elected instead to sit in
what I call the catbird seat—the seat to the right of the presiding
judge. I have proudly retained Justice Powell’s several notes to
me expressing his pleasure in sitting together.
I also learned much from him. Most fundamentally, I noticed
that when he came to court, he did so with a healthy disposition
in favor of the process given the parties by the lower court,
imposing squarely on the appellant the burden to demonstrate
why we should not affirm. While that sounds obvious, when
appellate judges so often spend time considering the intricacies of
individual issues—the trees in the forest, if you will—the forest
itself can be forgotten.
Just as we were all proud to have known Justice Powell, I am
proud to join Washington and Lee in honoring him here.
*

*

*

This afternoon, I propose to revisit the 1938 Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Those new rules employed a range of procedural
devices and an underlying procedural philosophy that had never
before been employed.4 It was no less than a bold experiment in
procedure.
Let me explain with some background. The 1938 Civil Rules
did not simply appear as the singular and immediate creation of
the Advisory Committee appointed by the Chief Justice in June of
2. See id. at 383 (holding that attorney advertising is not subject to
blanket suppression).
3. Id. at 389 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
4. See Paul V. Niemeyer, Is Now the Time for Simplified Rules of Civil
Procedure?, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 673, 675 (2013) [hereinafter Niemeyer,
Simplified Rules] (discussing the changes made by, and the impact of, the 1938
Rules).
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1935 to draft such rules.5 To the contrary, the Advisory
Committee’s work was the end of a long process that had begun
in earnest almost a hundred years earlier.6
Pleading in the federal courts had traditionally followed two
disconnected tracks—one for courts of equity and one for courts at
law.7 There was a third track for courts in admiralty,8 but that is
a story for another day.
With enactment of the Act of August 23, 1842,9 the Supreme
Court was authorized to regulate the process and procedures in
cases in equity, in admiralty, and at law.10 Acting on that
authority, the Court adopted admiralty rules and updated an
earlier set of equity rules.11 But it did nothing for rules in courts
at law.12 Instead, it left the procedure for those cases to be
controlled by the Conformity Act of 1828,13 which required the
procedure at law to be that applied in the courts of the State
5. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 710 (1998)
[hereinafter Subrin, Fishing Expeditions] (describing the process of establishing
the 1935 Advisory Committee).
6. See id. at 692–701 (discussing the developments that led to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
7. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
909, 918–20 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, Equity] (discussing the traditional
divisions between courts of equity and courts at law).
8. See id. at 929 (noting that admiralty jurisdiction was independent from
courts at equity and courts at law).
9. Act of August 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 6, 5 Stat. 516, 518 (1842).
10. See id.
[T]he Supreme Court shall have full power and authority . . . to
prescribe, and regulate, and alter the forms of writs and other process
to be used and issued in the district and circuit courts of the United
States . . . and other proceedings and pleadings, in suits at common
law, or in admiralty and in equity pending in the said courts . . . .
11. See HENRY M. HART JR. & HERBERT WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 579–80 (1953) (noting that the Supreme Court
promulgated ninety-two rules of equity and forty-seven admiralty rules in
response to the Act of August 23, 1842).
12. See id. at 584 (discussing the impact of the Act of August 23, 1842 on
actions at law, and noting that although the Court’s rule-making power was
affirmed by the Act, “courts were reluctant to use that power”).
13. Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, § 1, 4 Stat. 278 (1828).
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where the federal court sat and also by the more flexible
Conformity Act of 1872,14 which permitted federal courts to follow
current state practice.15 Of course, that state of affairs resulted in
the use of inconsistent rules of procedure in the federal courts to
the extent that state court procedures differed from State to
State. As might be expected, the resulting uncertainty and
confusion soon prompted calls for reform.
Efforts began in the 1880s to create uniformity by conforming
the rules for courts at law with the rules used in equity, except, of
course, as necessary to preserve the right to jury trials at law. 16
Those efforts, however, fizzled. Again in 1911, the American Bar
Association called for a uniform process in all federal courts17—a
call also made a year earlier by President Taft18—but that
initiative also fizzled. And the complaints about federal procedure
continued, as did the discussions and the circulation of ideas
through speeches, articles, and books.19
Without delving into the details of the ensuing history, it
suffices to say that Congress eventually enacted the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934,20 authorizing the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules for courts at law and, importantly, providing
that the Court “may at any time unite the general rules
prescribed by it for cases in equity with those in actions at law so
14. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196 (1872).
15. See Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, § 1, 4 Stat. 278, 278–81 (1828) (“[T]he
forms of . . . process . . . in the courts of the United States, held in those states
admitted into the Union . . . shall be the same in each of the said states . . . .”);
Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872) (permitting practice
and pleadings, except for admiralty and equity, to conform to state court
procedure).
16. See Subrin, Equity, supra note 7, at 932 (describing the rationale
behind seeking conformity for rules for courts at law and equity rules).
17. See id. at 944 n.202 (citing to ABA Report 50, which called for action to
create a uniform process to avoid delays and costs).
18. See William Howard Taft, Second Annual Message, December 6, 1910,
in 16 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 7492, 7522–23 (1906–1913)
(“One great crying need in the United States is cheapening the cost of litigation
by simplifying judicial procedure and expediting final judgment.”).
19. See Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 5, at 692–97 (discussing
complaints about procedure, discovery, and other litigation delays).
20. Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)).

REVISITING THE 1938 RULES EXPERIMENT

2161

as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for both.”21 And
this effort produced results. In 1935, the Supreme Court
appointed an Advisory Committee to draft new rules under the
authority of the Enabling Act, naming the former Attorney
General William D. Mitchell as chair and Yale Law School Dean
Charles E. Clark as reporter.22
Clark was then of the view that “most lawyers were [not]
sufficiently skilled to meet rigorous pleading requirements” of the
time and that “elaborate pleadings were [not] a useful way to
expose facts or narrow issues.”23 He had advocated simple,
flexible rules that combined law and equity and afforded broader
discovery.24 It was indeed true that the availability of discovery at
the time was minimal, even though it was thought to be
necessary to achieve justice. As George Ragland Jr., author of the
then-famous 1932 book, Discovery Before Trial, had observed,
“The lawyer who does not use discovery procedure is in the
position of a physician who treats a serious case without first
using the X-ray.”25 Both Clark and Ragland believed that greater
clarity in the definition of the issues would be obtained by greater
discovery, adopting the views of Professor Edson R. Sutherland of
the University of Michigan, who wrote, as a foreword to Ragland’s
book:
False and fictitious causes and defenses thrive under a system
of concealment and secrecy in the preliminary stages of
litigation followed by surprise and confusion at the trial. . . .
All this is well recognized by the profession, and yet there is a
wide-spread fear of liberalizing discovery. Hostility to “fishing
expeditions” before trial is a traditional and powerful taboo. 26

Against this background, the Advisory Committee began in
earnest and, after circulating two drafts to the public, proposed
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. See Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 5, at 710–12 (discussing
the members and formation of the 1935 Advisory Committee).
23. Id. at 711 n.133.
24. See id. at 712 (noting that in various publications Clark argued for
simpler rules that would also provide greater discretion to trial judges).
25. GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 251 (1932).
26. Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE RAGLAND JR., DISCOVERY
BEFORE TRIAL, at iii (1932).
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what ultimately became the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.27
*

*

*

The new Rules were bold and dramatic. As announced in
Rule 1, they were designed “to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every [civil] action”28 and with that
understanding, they were well received, indeed praised, at least
by judges and academics. Chief Judge John Parker of the Fourth
Circuit stated, perhaps with some hyperbole, that the new Rules
were “the best code of practice that is to be found anywhere in
this country, or for that matter anywhere in the world.”29
The 1938 Rules created one form of action known as a civil
action;30 provided for simplified pleading31 and simplified pretrial
proceedings that included a provision for a pretrial conference;32
provided liberal discovery through the largest range of discovery
mechanisms that had ever been authorized by a set of procedural
rules;33 provided for joinder;34 and included a summary judgment
procedure.35 But the basic elements of this new regime, as the
Supreme Court has described them, were “notice pleading,”
coupled with “broad and liberal” discovery.36 The role of pleading
27. See Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 5, at 729 (describing the
proposal and promulgation of the 1938 Rules).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. (1938).
29. John J. Parker, Book Review, 57 HARV. L. REV. 735, 736 (1944).
30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (1938) (“There is one form of action—the civil
action.”).
31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (1938) (providing general rules and standards for
pleading).
32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1938) (establishing rules for pretrial conferences
and scheduling).
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (1938) (elaborating on the range of discovery
provisions).
34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 18–20 (1938) (allowing joinder of claims and parties).
35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (1938) (describing summary judgment
procedures).
36. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (describing
the role of notice pleading); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957)
(describing the requirements of notice pleading and its relationship to liberal
discovery); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (endorsing liberal
discovery procedures).
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was thus downplayed and the role of discovery, enhanced. Under
the new order, the tasks of defining and shaping a case were
moved from the shoulders of a pleading practice and placed in the
arms of the multiple forms of discovery and a motions practice.
Let me amplify this a bit. Before 1938, the role of pleadings
was four-fold. Pleadings were designed (1) to give notice of the
nature of a claim or defense; (2) to state the facts each party
believed to exist; (3) to narrow the issues that were to be litigated;
and (4) to provide a means for the early and speedy disposition of
sham claims.37 The only traditional role of pleadings that
survived in the new 1938 rules was the role of giving fair notice of
a claim or defense.38 This minimalization of pleadings’ role can be
best appreciated by looking at Rule 84 and the forms attached to
the Civil Rules. Rule 84 provided that the forms attached to the
new rules were designed to indicate “the simplicity and brevity”
intended by the Rules.39 Thus, one sample form provided: “On
June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in
Boston, Massachusetts, defendant C.D. or defendant E.F., or both
defendants C.D. and E.F. willfully or recklessly or negligently
drove or caused to be driven a motor vehicle against plaintiff who
was then crossing said highway.”40 With the addition of a demand
for damages, that was it for a negligence complaint. Similarly,
the form of complaint given for a claim for goods sold and
delivered was even shorter: “Defendant owes plaintiff ten
thousand dollars for goods sold and delivered by plaintiff to
defendant between June 1, 1936 and December 1, 1936.”41
Evaluating candidly what was envisioned, we might conclude
today that notice pleading hardly even gave notice.
The 1938 Rules moved the other functions of traditional
pleading to later pretrial procedures. Thus, getting facts was
37.

See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 1202, at 88 (3d ed. 2004) (describing the historical functions of
pleading and the importance of those functions).
38. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (“[A]ll the Rules require is a ‘short and plain
statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”).
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 84. (1938).
40. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 10 (1938).
41. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 5 (1938).
AND PROCEDURE
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committed to discovery; narrowing the issues was committed to
pretrial motions, a pretrial conference, and summary judgment;
and the speedy disposition of sham claims was similarly
committed to a motions practice under Rules 12 and 56.42
As a consequence, the 1938 Rules, for the first time, at any
time and any where, gave a plaintiff almost unrestricted access to
court and its process, leaving other gatekeeping roles of
traditional pleading to be fulfilled by later procedures.43
At the same time that pleadings were minimalized, discovery
was significantly expanded and liberalized. Before 1938, any
available discovery was afforded by the rules of equity or by the
various state procedures incorporated into federal practice.
Discovery was minimal and conducted only with the discretion of
the court.44 And the mechanisms for discovery that did exist were
complex and difficult to use.45 By contrast, the 1938 Rules greatly
facilitated and broadened discovery, allowing a dazzling array of
discovery mechanisms, including oral depositions, depositions by
written interrogatories, depositions before an action was
commenced, interrogatories to parties, discovery of documents
and things, the physical and mental examination of parties by
physicians, and requests for admissions of fact.46 The discovery
rules also broadened the scope of discovery to cover any matter
relevant to or material to the subject matter involved in the
action.47
42. See Niemeyer, Simplified Rules, supra note 4, at 675 (describing the
general impact of the 1938 Rules on traditional pleading).
43. See id. at 676–77 (describing the discovery-centered practice which has
developed since the 1938 Rules).
44. See Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 5, at 698–99 (noting that
use of discovery was strictly limited before 1938).
45. See id. at 698–701 (describing discovery procedures in federal courts
prior to the 1938 rules).
46. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (1938) (describing discovery procedures and
policies).
47. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), 34 (1938) (“Unless otherwise ordered by the
court . . . the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . .”);
FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1938) (granting the court discretion to order inspection,
copying or photographing of a variety of materials which contain “evidence
material to any matter involved in the action”).
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In addition, the 1938 Rules authorized attorneys to obtain
blank subpoenas without leave of court, which allowed the
attorneys to compel, without prior court authority, the
attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary
evidence.48 As Paul Carrington, a former reporter to the Civil
Rules Committee, later noted with some cynicism: “We now have
900,000 attorneys running about with almost unrestrained
subpoena power.”49
Over the years, the new devices introduced in the 1938 Rules
were enhanced. While notice pleading remained as originally
promulgated in 1938, discovery was expanded in scope and
facility through amendments made in 1946, 1963, 1966, and
1970.50 The 1946 amendments expanded discovery’s scope to
allow discovery of even inadmissible evidence, so long as it was
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.51 The
amendments also eliminated the need to obtain leave of court for
taking depositions.52 Eliminating court approval for document
requests was accomplished by the 1970 amendments.53
In the spirit of the new rules, the Supreme Court in 1947
issued its seminal opinion in Hickman v. Taylor,54 which directed
courts to accord discovery “a broad and liberal treatment.”55 The
Court explained, “No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing
48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (1938) (“The clerk shall issue a
subpoena . . . signed and sealed but otherwise in blank, to a party requesting it
who shall fill it in before service.”).
49. Niemeyer, Simplified Rules, supra note 4, at 677 (internal citations
omitted).
50. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 37, § 2002, at 34 (discussing the
history of Federal Discovery rules and elaborating on amendments to the rules).
51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1946) (“Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.”).
52. See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS
OF THE UNITED STATES 32–34 (June 1946) (eliminating the need for a court’s
permission to obtain depositions).
53. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 37, § 2207, at 137 (discussing the
1970 Amendment to Rule 34 and its impact on procedures for requesting
documents).
54. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
55. Id. at 507.
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expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation.”56
In sum, the 1938 Rules shifted procedural battles from the
pleading stage of litigation to the newly created discovery stage
and reassigned the responsibility for resolving discovery disputes
from the court to the attorneys.57 This latter innovation was
especially surprising in the context of America’s strong
adversarial system.58 The Rules demanded that the warring
parties work out these differences. Because this new structure of
procedure had never before been created or used, it was indeed a
bold experiment, albeit a well-intended one, to replace the highly
restrictive and complex pretrial process that had existed prior to
1938.59
*

*

*

Rule commentators applauded the new direction as a
triumph of American law.60 Indeed, Armistead Dobie, the Dean of
the University of Virginia School of Law, who later became a
judge on the Fourth Circuit, characterized the new Rules as
“revolutionary.”61 But it was received with substantial hesitation
by those practicing under the rules. Trial lawyers, who were
familiar with the traditional procedures, were understandably
somewhat hostile to the new ideas. In response to this resistance,
efforts were undertaken to educate the bar and to sell the new
regime. District Judge Louis E. Goodman, recognizing that
lawyers and judges considered the former practice as
56. Id. (footnote omitted).
57. See Niemeyer, Simplified Rules, supra note 4, at 677 (noting that
parties were expected to resolve differences outside of court).
58. See id. at 676 (commenting that modifying discovery practices is
“enigmatic” given the adversarial context of U.S. legal practices).
59. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the changes
brought about by the 1938 rules).
60. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 37, § 1008, at 54–55 (describing the
enthusiastic reception of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
61. See Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L.
REV. 261, 275 (1939) (“If the term ‘revolutionary’ can be correctly applied to any
part of the new rules, that part is discovery.”).
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“sacrosanct,” sought to persuade them by packaging his message
with the aspiration of achieving justice for the litigating parties. 62
As he explained to reluctant lawyers and judges in California:
The adroit procedural maneuvering of the earlier days in the
pleading stage, often invoked to deprive a litigant of his day in
court, is now relegated to the archives. . . . Thus the complaint
and the answer need do no more than, in colloquial manner,
state on the part of the complaining party, “you did” and on
the part of the answering party, “I did not.”

*

*

*

But pleadings no longer determine the issues to be tried. In
effect, all they do is generally apprise the parties of the nature
of the claim and the defense. Thus time and effort and expense
is saved. Much of the reluctance to accept the philosophy of the
new procedure was due to a failure on the part of many
lawyers and some judges to distinguish between the pleading
stage in litigation and the trial preparation stage. Information
in the pleadings stage is widely different from information as
to evidentiary matters necessary for proper trial preparation.
Whereas simplification is made the keynote of pleadings, wide
opportunity and liberality in the obtaining of information as to
factual matters needed for the trial is made the keynote of the
discovery rules.63

The efforts to sell the 1938 Rules were successful, and even now
few question their success.
*

*

*

My thesis today, however, intends to open up some basic
questions about them. Despite their original benign purpose to
secure the speedy and inexpensive resolution of cases, the 1938
Rules, as applied in the ever-changing context of civil litigation,
have over the years actually increased both the length of the
litigation process and its cost.64 And, as a happy-for-some
62. See Louis E. Goodman, The New Spirit in Federal Court Procedure, 7
F.R.D. 449, 449 (1947) (advocating for change to secure results based on justice,
rather than results determined by procedure).
63. Id. at 450.
64. See Niemeyer, Simplified Rules, supra note 4, at 677 (describing
increased costs and delays due to changes brought about by the 1938 Rules).
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byproduct, the 1938 Rules have vastly increased the income to
trial attorneys65—those who, ironically, were originally reluctant
to embrace the Rules.
Let me first address some of the changing contexts. Based on
a growing recognition that substantial sums may be awarded for
pain and suffering and for punishment—something that was
almost impossible in 1938—litigation has become an enticing
lottery in which attorneys have come to participate as
entrepreneurs.66 In that context, a jury awarding $10 million for
pain and suffering to a severely burned plaintiff is taken to be
appropriate—but so would another jury’s award of $1 million for
the same level of pain and suffering.67 Similarly, an award of $5
billion in punitive damages can be found as appropriate as would
another jury’s award of $50 million for the same conduct.68 These
are the tort law’s irrational aspects—by which I mean subjective
aspects that cannot be predicted or measured by objective
standards—and they have amplified the effects of the liberal
procedural devices adopted in 1938.69
Another major change in the legal landscape occurred in
1966, with the adoption of Rule 23, the current class action rule,
which was, at the time, intended only to codify and make efficient
a procedural practice that had been employed in equity.70 But the
1966 changes had unintended consequences, and beginning in the
1980s when the rule was employed more robustly, it began to tax
the limits of many other procedural rules and even to take on a
quasi-legislative role.

65. See id. at 676 (arguing that disputes stemming from expected selfregulation delay lawsuits and enhance attorney compensation).
66. See Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational
Centerpiece of our Tort System, 90 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1405 (2004) (discussing the
financial incentives to practice in the tort system).
67. See id. at 1403 (discussing the arbitrary and irrational nature of pain
and suffering awards).
68. See id. at 1409 (arguing that punitive damages are arbitrary and based
on a jury’s reactions, rather than a rational basis).
69. See id. at 1401 (discussing the lack of rational criteria in measuring
damages in the tort system).
70. See 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 37, § 1753 (describing the impact of
the 1966 amendment on Rule 23).
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Finally, technology has exacerbated procedural problems,
especially in the area of discovery. The invention of xerography in
1960 made documents substantially more numerous and
discovery therefore more expensive.71 And the proliferation of
email and electronic document storage beginning in the early
1990s multiplied that effect exponentially, creating millions of
documents relevant to a typical commercial case.72 When I came
to the bar in the late 1960s, I can remember that a serious
commercial case might have then generated several banker’s
boxes of documents that could readily be reviewed within a
reasonable time. The same case today, however, might generate a
warehouse of documents and millions of emails saved on hard
drives with programs and operating systems rendered obsolete by
newer technologies, making the identification, recovery, and
review of potentially relevant documents almost intolerably
expensive.
*

*

*

Beginning in the 1970s, the bar and the public, as well as
public officials, began to complain about the judicial process
afforded in federal courts. While the complaints were indeed
directed at delay and expense, they focused on judicial
management, targeting only indirectly the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.73 In 1976, Chief Justice Warren Burger convened the
Pound Conference in order “to assess the troubled state of
litigation.”74 In addressing discovery, the Conference concluded
that “[w]ild fishing expeditions, since any material which might
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is discoverable, seem
to be the norm.”75
71. See Niemeyer, Simplified Rules, supra note 4, at 677 (describing
increased costs due to enhanced document production).
72. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 314–15 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (describing the complexities of electronic data storage, large amounts of
documents generated by email, and attendant costs of retrieval).
73. See Niemeyer, Simplified Rules, supra note 4, at 678 (noting proposals
to modify the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by the ABA, the Supreme Court,
and other organizations).
74. Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery—The Rush to
Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1992).
75. William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A
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And similarly, in 1977 the American Bar Association
embarked on a major effort to persuade the Civil Rules
Committee to make changes to restrict the broad scope of
discovery authorized by Rule 26.76 When its efforts failed, the
American College of Trial Lawyers proposed similar changes in
the 1990s.77
Around the same time, the President’s Council on
Competitiveness issued a report claiming that the judicial system
had become burdened with excessive costs and long delays.78 The
report claimed that each year the United States was spending an
“estimated $300 billion as an indirect cost of the civil justice
system”79 and “$80 billion a year in direct . . . costs.”80 The report
blamed discovery as the chief culprit. It claimed that “over 80% of
the time and cost of a typical lawsuit involves pretrial
examination of facts through discovery.”81
In 1988, Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements and
Access to Justice Act82 as a renewal of the long-standing goal that
federal court systems secure the “just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action.”83 Congress identified as culprits
delay, insufficient support services in the courts, spiraling costs
caused by litigation expenses and attorneys’ fees, and unfair and
inconsistent decisions brought on by pressures placed on judges
who had to cope with the torrent of litigation.84 In addition to the
Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288
(1978).
76. See Second Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery
Abuse, 92 F.R.D. 149, 157 (1980) (discussing proposed changes to Rule 26,
including limiting discovery to “issues,” not subject matter).
77. See Niemeyer, Simplified Rules, supra note 4, at 679 (describing the
College’s proposed amendment).
78. See Dan Quayle, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, 60 U. CIN.
L. REV. 979, 979 (1991) (discussing the need for civil justice reform).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 980.
81. Id. at 981.
82. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
102 Stat. 4642 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 101–1023 (2012)).
83. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
84. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 23 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5892, 5893–94 (describing findings of the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
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enactment of the 1988 Act, Congress enacted the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, again to reduce costs and delay in litigation.85
Actions authorized and directed by the 1990 Act led to the modest
1993 and 2000 amendments to the Civil Rules relating to case
management and discovery.86
During this period of public comment and criticism, the
Supreme Court began to address costs and delay in civil
procedure through its decisions. For the first time, the Court
retreated from its earlier endorsement of broad-discovery, as
articulated in Hickman v. Taylor.87 For example, in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,88 decided in 1975, the Court
explicitly lamented the potential for abuse “of the liberal
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”89 In
Herbert v. Lando,90 decided in 1979, the Court noted that
“mushrooming litigation costs” were in large part due to pretrial
discovery, declaring that “[t]here have been repeated expressions
of concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices
from this Court have joined the chorus.”91 In 1987, the Court in
Anderson v. Creighton92 expanded qualified immunity based in
substantial part on the disruptive effect of “broad-ranging
discovery.”93
Liberties and the Administration of Justice regarding federal court functions).
85. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5089, 5090 (codified as amended at §§ 28 U.S.C. 471–82 (2012)) (“Because the
increasing volume and complexity of civil and criminal cases imposes
increasingly heavy workload burdens . . . it is necessary to create an effective
administrative structure to ensure ongoing consultation and communication
regarding effective litigation management and cost and delay reduction
principles and techniques.”).
86. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 37, § 2003, at 41–42 (describing the
1993 and 2000 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
87. See Niemeyer, Simplified Rules, supra note 4, at 682 (noting that the
Supreme Court began demonstrating reluctance towards broad discovery rules
in the 1970s).
88. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
89. Id. at 741.
90. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
91. Id. at 176.
92. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
93. Id. at 646 n.6.
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In addition to focusing on the breadth and cost of discovery,
the Court also began to recognize the benefits of enhanced
pleading and summary judgment procedures. In Celotex v.
Catrett,94 the Court encouraged the broader use of the summary
judgment process as a protection of the rights of defendants faced
with meritless claims in a notice pleading system.95 And in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,96 the Court addressed directly how the
pleading stage could mitigate potential abuses of discovery. As
the Court explained:
[I]t is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot
be solved by “careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary
judgment stage” much less “lucid instructions to juries”; the
threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious
defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those
proceedings.97

Indeed, the Court cited a letter I had written as Chair of the Civil
Rules Committee to the Chair of the Standing Committee,
reporting on a RAND Institute finding that “discovery accounts
for as much as 90 percent of litigation costs when discovery is
actively employed.”98 A few years later, in 2009, the Court in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal99 again took another step in that same direction,
holding that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”100 This heightened
pleading requirement was new—indeed, shockingly new to
some—and was, I suggest, nothing less than a retreat from the
minimalism of notice pleading.
To be sure, these responses by Congress, the Civil Rules
Committee, and the Supreme Court have, on a small scale,
targeted some of the problems inherent in the 1938 design. But
94. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
95. See id. at 327 (noting that “with the advent of ‘notice pleading,’ the
motion to dismiss seldom fulfills th[e] function” of preventing factually
insufficient cases from going to trial).
96. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
97. Id. at 559.
98. Id. (citation omitted).
99. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
100. Id. at 678 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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they have not questioned the larger structure. And, I submit, an
inappropriate level of cost and delay still persists in civil
procedure.
It seems to me that Article III of the Constitution must be
construed to require that the Third Branch provide citizens with
an effective and efficient court system that resolves disputes in a
speedy and inexpensive manner. Indeed, this harkens back to the
Magna Carta itself, which provides: “Nulli vendemus, nulli
negabimus, aut differmus justitiam, vel rectum [To no one will we
sell, to no one will we deny, or delay right or justice].”101 Is it
acceptable that we have a civil procedure for resolving disputes
that allows even routine commercial disputes to linger in a trial
court for three years or more and that costs the litigants in the
hundreds of thousands of dollars? Most people and small
businesses cannot afford to use such a procedure. In large
measure because of this, our citizens continue to flee from courts
for the resolution of their disputes, running to employ private
arbitration, mediation, and private settlement courts with the
hope of resolving their disputes in a timely and efficient manner.
Must we not understand this flight as nothing less than the
public’s condemnation of the court procedures that we are now
providing?
*

*

*

When I was Chairman of the Civil Rules Committee, I
appreciated the scope of these problems. And I also appreciated
the reality that basic changes could probably not, for political
reasons, then be accomplished. The promulgation of federal rules
had by that time become a public, legislative process, with
lobbyists representing various positions actively engaged in the
process. For better or worse, long lost were the days when an
advisory committee, holed up in a conference room, could
accomplish its work in private, focusing only on the public good as
it saw it.

101. King John, MAGNA CARTA, Art. 40 (1215), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES 17 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., rev. ed. 1991) (emphasis
added).
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But I did have extended discussions about the subject with
Professor Edward Cooper, our Reporter, and Professor Geoffrey
Hazard, who was leading the American Law Institute’s effort in
designing Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure. We explored
what features might be considered essential to civil process, what
might be considered baggage, and what a fair and inexpensive
process might look like. In the end, we came upon the idea of
promulgating a set of parallel rules that would provide a
simplified and efficient procedure for at least some cases. And I
thought privately that if a set of parallel simplified rules were to
work, maybe someday such rules could even replace important
aspects of the original 1938 Rules.
When we broached the idea of a set of parallel simplified
rules to the entire Civil Rules Committee and to the Standing
Committee, everyone who expressed a view welcomed the idea, as
did the Chief Justice in private conversations.
Professor Cooper undertook to begin the drafting process
along the lines that we had discussed. His draft included, as its
“central feature,” “a major transfer of pretrial communication
away from discovery and to fact pleading and disclosure.”102 This
central feature addressed directly the course correction
necessary, but only for a limited class of cases. The draft proposed
the mandatory application of the simplified rules to all small
money-damage actions and an elective application to larger
money-damage actions.103 It did not provide for application to
proceedings in equity.
The basic elements of the proposal were these:
First, the draft would require pleadings to become more
detailed, enabling an earlier serious look at the merits of a case.
Under the proposal, a complaint would state “the details of the
time, place, participants, and events involved in the claim,” and
would have attached to it “each document the pleader may use to
support the claim.”104 This approach, to some extent, anticipated
102. Edward H. Cooper, Simplified Rules of Procedure?, 100 MICH. L. REV.
1794, 1800–01 (2002).
103. See id. at 1805 (describing the application to small and large money
damage actions).
104. Id. at 1808.
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the approach that the Supreme Court later took in Twombly and
Iqbal. The proposal also authorized the immediate disposition of
some claims through the use of verified complaints and answers
and a mini-summary judgment process.105 Under the proposal,
the answer would likewise have to state the defendant’s position
with the same detail required for the complaint, including the
factual basis for any avoidances and affirmative defenses.106
Second, the draft would enhance early discovery disclosures,
which would have to be made within twenty days of the filing of
the last pleading.107 While retaining Rule 26’s requirements in
part, the draft would mandate a greater level of disclosure, more
closely imitating what would amount to a basic form of discovery,
but without the need for a request.108 Combined with the
enhanced pleadings, this second proposal would “front-load”
pretrial communications so as to enable earlier and less
expensive disposition of cases.
Third, the draft would restrict discovery, presumptively
authorizing
only
three
three-hour
depositions,
ten
interrogatories, and only requests for documents and intangible
things that “specifically identify” the matters requested.109
Fourth, the draft would reduce the burden of the motions
practice, requiring that all motions be combined and filed early in
the proceedings—within thirty days of the last pleading—and
providing that their filing not suspend any other time limitation
established by the rules.110
Fifth and finally, the draft would require that upon the filing
of a complaint, the clerk of the district court would schedule the
trial of the case not later than six months after the filing date,
and that the specific trial date would be included in the summons

105. See id. at 1811 (describing the documentation requirements for a
demand for judgment).
106. See id. at 1808 (describing the requirements for an answer to a claim
for relief).
107. Id. at 1813.
108. See id. at 1813–15 (describing the procedures and rationales behind the
modified disclosure provisions).
109. Id. at 1816.
110. See id. at 1812 (describing motion practice under the proposed draft).
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served with the complaint.111 Incidentally, this one change, as
found by a study conducted by the Institute for Civil Justice at
RAND, would constitute the single best practice for reducing
costs and delay in litigation.112
The Civil Rules Committee was never able to begin a debate
on the project, as my tenure as Chair, which had already been
extended once by the Chief Justice, expired. Had I been able to
continue with the project, however, I would have introduced three
additional ideas for consideration.
First, I would have asked that the proposal expand the scope
of the simplified rules’ applicability, making them available for
all damage actions and some equity actions and mandatory for a
larger segment of actions.
Second, I would have directed an effort of exploring whether
incentives could be established to encourage both plaintiffs’ and
defendants’ attorneys to elect to use the simplified rules when
their use was not mandatory. Making the simplified rules
mandatory or leveraging incentives would address the problems
identified by the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation at Duke
University, which concluded that “few lawyers would opt for a
simplified track and . . . many would seek to opt out if initially
assigned to it.”113 Alternatively, I might have even suggested that
the Committee consider a proposal that a judge review all civil
complaints as part of his authorizing process to issue, enabling
the judge to control the application of the simplified rules to the
case.
Third, I would have initiated a discussion aimed at trimming
down the scope of the summary judgment practice under Rule 56.
That rule now allows, even encourages, expensive mini-trials
within the pretrial phase of the larger case, and its use results in
111. See id. at 1818 (describing the procedure to set a trial date on filing).
112. See James S. Kakalik et al., An Evaluation of Judicial Case
Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE 56
(1996), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/
MR800.pdf (noting that shorter discovery time reduces attorney work hours and
data on costs is consistent with data on work hours).
113. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM., REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 9 (2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/2010%20report.pdf.
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disproportionately large costs and delay. Indeed, as a trial
lawyer, I had concluded in the later years of trying cases that it
was often more efficient and less costly (and usually strategically
superior) to press for trial without engaging in the summary
judgment process. District Judge Brock Hornby has agreed with
me on this, as he wrote in a 2010 article, Summary Judgment
Without Illusions.114
*

*

*

Wherever we now go—and I believe that there is currently
some movement in the Civil Rules Committee to resurrect the
simplified rules project—we must recognize that as matters
currently stand, federal civil procedure is simply too timeconsuming and costly, by a large margin. While the goals of the
1938 experiment were laudable in the context of the legal practice
that existed when they were conceived and adopted, it is now
time to review the experiment. And I suggest that a good starting
point would be to begin with the simplified rules project that
Professor Cooper and I initiated in 1999. In any event, I firmly
believe that nothing short of a serious dialogue on reform is now
in order to begin addressing the judiciary’s current unmet
responsibilities under Article III.
I should add that it surely would be naive of me to suggest
that promulgating simplified rules would solve all of the current
problems in civil procedure. Today’s litigation world has become
too complex for such a hope. But, such an undertaking would
undoubtedly refocus attention on the big picture, as was done in
1215 at Runnymeade, and in 1938 in Washington, D.C. Who
knows, such new attention might open the way to a completely
new and better thinking on judicial process for the modern world.
And maybe, the students at Washington and Lee could be the
early facilitators.
Thank you for this privilege of addressing you.

114. See D. Brock Hornby, Summary Judgment Without Illusions, 3 GREEN
BAG 2D 273, 287 (2010) (“[W]hen in doubt whether facts or inferences (not law)
support summary judgment, judges should ‘just say no’ and let the case proceed
to trial or settlement.”).

